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Defending a Person Charged with Genocide
Anthony D'Amato*
In August 1997, I was asked to represent Dr. Milan Kovacevic, a Bosnian Serb
anesthesiologist who had been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") for complicity in genocide. Had he lived through it, his trial
would have been the first by the ICTY for the crime of genocide. I would like to
describe some of the tribulations of defending clients accused of grave humanitarian
offenses in the ICTY. Perhaps by relating stories of my experiences there, some
insights for reform can be drawn. First, I will begin with the background of the case
itself
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AGAINST DR. KOVACEVIC
Dusan Vucicevic, a schoolmate and fellow anesthesiologist of Kovacevic's, asked
me to take his friend's case. The opportunity seemed fascinating, but the idea of
defending a genocidal maniac (as I then conceived of it) was quite foreign to my
world-view. There were many publicity-seeking attorneys who were anxious to defend
a person accused of genocide, so he certainly could have gotten another lawyer if I
turned him down. I felt free to accept or reject the case depending on what I could
find out about Dr. Kovacevic and the context in which he operated.
Dr. Kovacevic was the chief anesthesiologist and chief administrator of the
Prijedor City Hospital in Prijedor, Bosnia (formally known as Republica Srbska). Dr.
Kovacevic also served as deputy mayor of that town, and it was in his official position
that he was indicted by the ICTY for genocide. He was at work in the hospital on the
morning ofJuly 10, 1997, when some unknown individuals arrived, claiming to have a
Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University. This essay is dedicated to Professor M.
Cherif Bassiouni, who more than any other person was responsible for the coming-into-being of the
international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. I met Cherif in 1967 at the Wingspread
Conference, the first conference of scholars assembled to work out a plan for a future international
criminal court. We both worked on the subcommittee to define "aggression," a subject that still lacks
a good definition even though the court of our visions in 1967-now the International Criminal
Court-is rapidly being ratified and should soon begin its work.
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Red Cross package to deliver to him downstairs. He went downstairs to receive the
package, but it turned out to be a set-up: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") detectives were waiting for him. They arrested him and stuck him on a
helicopter along with the local police chiefs son. The son had been arrested by
NATO after Simo Drjaca, his father (who was the indicted person) was shot to
death while resisting NATO arrest. The detectives took the doctor and the young
man to Tuzla and put them into a metal container, the kind used for transatlantic
shipping. With the scorching July sun beating down on this metal container, the
container's heaters were turned on, and the two men were pushed against the wall. It
was so hot in the container that the NATO soldiers could not bear to remain in it for
more than a few minutes at a time. While the two prisoners were standing against the
wall, Dr. Kovacevic's indictment of complicity in genocide was read to them-there
was no indictment against the police chiefs son-by NATO personnel entering and
leaving the trailer. As the indictment was slowly read, soldiers came in and out,
pressing their guns against the back of the prisoners' heads and clicking the triggers.
Each time the prisoners thought they would be killed. The procedure went on for a
couple of hours Then the two prisoners were taken out of the sealed container and
transported by helicopter to the detention center in The Hague, where soon after his
arrival, Dr. Kovacevic suffered his first heart attack.2 I have reason to believe that
when he died of an aneurysm some eleven months later (two weeks into his trial), his
death may have been caused in part by the torture he endured at the hands of the
NATO police.
I did not immediately accept the offer to defend Dr. Kovacevic at the time I was
approached to do so in Chicago. Instead I left the question open, pending my first trip
to The Hague. Before undertaking the trip, I studied the situation of a deputy mayor
in a Yugoslavian city in order to obtain background about my client. I compared what
I studied to the lengthy indictment issued against him.
The recent history of Yugoslavia revealed that as a result of the long years of rule
under the progressive communist Marshall Tito, three distinct chains of command
have been established throughout the state: the police, the military, and the civilian.
These three "branches" of government were not just distinct, they were "entirely
separated. Police matters belonged to the police, army matters to the army, and
whatever belonged to neither was the provenance of civilian authority. This divided
structure was so rigidly enforced that I could not imagine how a civilian official such
as Dr. Kovacevic, a deputy mayor, would have any authority over detention camps set
up by the army or the police. In fact, if a civilian official tried to exert any authority
i. The indictment was read in English and Serbian, and it was a lengthy document.
2.

I stated these allegations in full in open court at a pretrial stage in the case of Dr. Kovacevic. The
prosecutor made no comment nor objection, and the judges asked me no question about my account
of what had happened.
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over the camps, he would probably have found himselfjoining the camp's population.
In short, no one crossed governmental power lines. Of course, this system was found
to be quite useful in avoiding responsibility. As I discovered by reading news articles
and books by investigative reporters on the Yugoslav civil wars, when reporters tried
to inspect the various detention camps spread throughout Yugoslavia, the army
officials guarding the camps claimed to lack authority to let the reporters in. The
reporters knew that this was not true. They suspected the army officials to have been
ordered to deny any authority over the camps so as to protect all army personnel
against future indictments if war crimes occurred in the camps.
I must add that such future indictments were not expected to come entirely from
international tribunals. Violations of the laws of war were also crimes under
Yugoslavian law. Yugoslavian leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, Radtko Mladic,
and Radovan Karadzic-perhaps on the advice of their attorneys-sent out many
directives to the army and police not to engage in any kind of criminal activity
prohibited by The Hague and Geneva Conventions, and if they did so they would be
court-martialed and prosecuted for those crimes by Yugoslavian authorities. Thus it
became standard operating procedure for army and police officials to deny any
knowledge of torture, rape, brutality, and especially genocide. And as I have said, they
denied any authority for setting up the detention camps where torture and rape
allegedly occurred, and instead claimed that authority and control over the camps was
in the hands of the civilian authorities.
If the official documents contained blanket prohibitions on criminal activities, I
wondered how the "real" orders were conveyed to the army and the police. I
discovered, by reading histories of the brave Serbian resistance movement during
World War II, that the Chetniks (the original "freedom fighters") were able to
frustrate the Nazi occupiers by never wearing any military insignia or identification of
any sort, by never accepting written orders from anyone, and only by obeying
comrades in the resistance movement who were personally known to them. The
Yugoslav resistance against the German Army was tremendously effective, thus
testifying to the efficacy of a system of oral orders sent down through a rigid chain of
command. This tradition of non-identification, facial recognition, and verbal orders of
course carried through the army and police after the Tito regime ended, and has made
it especially difficult for the prosecutors at the ICTY to obtain evidence of "command
authority" to prosecute Yugoslavian leaders for war crimes committed by the regular
army, the paramilitary army, and the police.
With this general background in mind, I tentatively signed up to represent Dr.
Kovacevic subject to the possibility of withdrawing after I had checked the case out at
The Hague. Once in The Hague, I watched the process of selecting defense counsel.
Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, provides lawyers free of charge to Serbians on trial at
The Hague. Dr. Kovacevic had been provided one of these attorneys before I was
contacted, and after he accepted me he dismissed his Serbian counsel. Dr. Kovacavic
did not trust the Belgrade lawyer and he told me that he was not sure that the lawyer
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was entirely on his side. As I discovered, it is possible, in high profile political cases,
that the home country is more interested in protecting officials at home who have not
been indicted than in protecting an arrested person like Dr. Kovacevic. Indeed, at my
first meeting with the prosecutor, I was told that what the Office of the Prosecution
most wanted from Dr. Kovacevic was his testimony as a witness against other high
officials in Serbia. For this cooperation, the prosecutor was willing to plea-bargain. It
was certainly clear to me, at that meeting, that ifI could get a good deal for my client, I
might reach a tentative agreement with the prosecutor subject to my client's approval.
I would not protect any at-large war criminals in Serbia. In fact, my sympathies were
entirely on the side of the job the tribunal was doing, and I regarded myself as an
officer of the court whose responsibility it was to help the tribunal be fair and render
justice by virtue of the adversarial process. In contrast, the many Yugoslavian lawyers
representing defendants at the ICTY contemptuously referred to it as a kangaroo
court. Before seeing Dr. Kovacevic in the detention center, I had a preliminary
meeting with the prosecutor assigned to the Kovacevic case. Mr. Michael Keegan had
been in the office of the Judge Advocate General and served as a prosecutor in the US
military in numerous court-martials. A relatively young and no-nonsense kind of
person, Mr. Keegan met me in the hallway of the tribunal building. I suggested that
we go to his office on the top floor of the building, but he said that the entire
prosecutor's offices were off-bounds to defense counsel. Having seen the cramped
little room in which I was supposed to do my work, I asked him rhetorically if the
reason for that rule was to keep defense counsel from drawing comparisons.
But what I was really thinking about in my meeting with Mr. Keegan were two
questions: first, what hard evidence did he have against Dr. Kovacevic, and second, if
he did have hard evidence, was there room for reasonable plea bargaining. In my own
mind I had no intention of going to trial if there was evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dr. Kovacevic was complicitous in the commission of genocide. In that
case, I would have met with him in the detention center and told him frankly that I
would use my best efforts to get him the best possible deal with the prosecutor, but
that I would not be effective as his trial attorney. He would be better off finding an
attorney who had no psychological difficulty in the possibility of freeing a genocidal
killer. On the other hand, I thought, if Mr. Keegan had no hard evidence to tell me
about and my best judgment indicated that Dr. Kovacevic was not in fact complicit in
the commission of genocide, then I could defend him zealously.
There was no doubt that Dr. Kovacevic had foolishly shot his mouth off during
the crisis. Like many people interviewed by a TV crew, he launched into his personal
ideology and "wisdom" about the situation in Yugoslavia. Mr. Keegan showed me the
transcripts of Dr. Kovacevic's television interviews (which were widely broadcast at
the time), and I later had occasion to view the tapes. The deputy mayor of Prijedor
had no reservation in telling the television cameras that the Serbs and the Muslims in
Prijedor could no longer live peacefilly together, and that if the Muslims were wise
they would move out of town. He said that there were many other cities where the
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majority Muslim population had expelled the Serbs. Resettlement and homeswapping is inevitable, Dr. Kovacevic said, because he foresaw violence erupting in the
increasingly volatile town of Prijedor.
Now perhaps a deputy mayor should have been more politically correct, more
inclusive, more pluralistic. But from what I could determine, he had committed no
crime in stating his personal opinions, no matter how forcefully and no matter how
strongly he held them. And indeed, in the bloody aftermath, it would seem that any
Muslim citizens of Prijedor who had taken Dr. Kovacevic's advice and moved out of
town might today owe their lives to him. The Dayton Accords, promising a unified,
pluralistic Bosnia, have never even gotten off the ground, and a great deal of blood has
been shed since the Accords were signed in 1994.
I also knew, from reading documents prior to my meeting with Mr. Keegan, that
Dr. Kovacevic seemed to have no personal prejudice against Muslims or Croats. As
director of the city hospital, he had insisted on the retention of Muslim doctors at a
time when other civilian authorities were clamoring for their removal. After the civil
war started to reach Prijedor, he insisted that the hospital take in and care for
Muslims who had been shot or otherwise wounded by the Serbian army and
paramilitary forces, even though enormous pressure was put upon him to bar the
hospital doors to such persons. The population of Prijedor at the time was evenly
divided between Serbs and Muslims, and Dr. Kovacevic had the respect of both
groups.
I asked Mr. Keegan whether he had any evidence in his possession that Dr.
Kovacevic had ordered any acts of genocide? No. I asked whether the prosecutor had
any evidence that Dr. Kovacevic had ever participated in any acts of genocide? No.
Was there any evidence that he had ever seen or otherwise witnessed the commission
of any acts of genocide? No. Was there any evidence that Dr. Kovacevic was
connected in any way to the commission of acts of genocide. No. Was there any
evidence that Dr. Kovacevic was in the chain of command that could have orally
ordered the commission of any acts of genocide? He signed some orders that arguably
facilitated the commission of genocide. As deputy mayor of Prijedor, which was home
to a major Serbian detention camp, Dr. Kovacevic would have had substantial local
knowledge and some connection to the camp by virtue of his municipal duties such as
making sure that transportation to the camp was available and that electric lights in
the city were on. These were the kinds of municipal orders that Dr. Kovacevic had
signed, and a great deal would be made of them at trial.
What I heard was enough to convince me that I could defend Dr. Kovacevic in
good faith. I did not know what the factual evidence might eventually show, but he
was entitled to have those facts tested for accuracy, sufficiency, and relevance at trial.
He was entitled to the vigorous cross-examination of witnesses against him.
After a brief meeting and consultation (the Registrar provided a translator) with
my client at the detention center, I met again with Prosecutor Keegan. We discussed a
plea bargain. In return for Dr. Kovacevic's plea of guilt of genocide, his total
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cooperation regarding the identification of other perpetrators, and his willingness to
appear as a witness against them if they are apprehended, Keegan said that the Office
of the Prosecutor would ask the tribunal to impose a lighter sentence. "No deal," I
replied. I would not have my client admit that he was guilty of the worst crime in the
world-genocide-if in fact he was innocent. I would have considered, however, a
plea bargain to a lesser crime. It was Mr. Keegan's turn to say "No way." Dr.
Kovacevic was the biggest "fish" caught so far and this was the first trial for genocide at
the ICTY. I could see that there were political issues here. In its first genocide trial,
the ICTY was not about to explain to the world that it was wrong in indicting Dr.
Kovacevic for genocide. Would reporters then ask the tribunal the embarrassing
question whether Simo Drljaca, who was accused along with Dr. Kovacevic of
genocide, was also not guilty? If so, did not the British NATO soldiers overreact by
shooting him in the back when he was resisting arrest?
However, an idea occurred to me that Mr. Keegan said he had never heard
before. I suggested that if the prosecution would put a cap of five years on my client's
sentence in the event that he was found guilty of complicity in genocide, I would then
arrange for my client to provide the prosecution with all the names and information
that he had, along with a promise to be a witness against these named suspects. But if
Dr. Kovacevic were acquitted, then he would have no obligation to cooperate with the
prosecution. Mr. Keegan did not like this proposal-I did not think he would.
At the end of our meeting it was quite clear that the prosecutor would be going
all-out to convict Dr. Kovacevic. It was going to be a rigorous and difficult trial. When
the trial was only into its third week, as I have previously mentioned, Dr. Kovacevic
died. But there had already been voluminous pretrial proceedings, oral arguments in
open and closed sessions, examination of documents, and viewing of videotapes.
II. OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ICTY

In the course of preparing for trial, it became clear to me that my client knew a
great deal about the chain of command in Bosnia and Serbia. His information would
be valuable to the Office of the Prosecutor. It stood to reason that many people in
Belgrade who may have commanded the commission of war crimes, who had not been
arrested or even indicted, would have considerable interest in encouraging a person
who is on trial, through his Belgrade attorneys, not to divulge such information with
the prosecutor. To be sure, some of the lower-level defendants at The Hague-those
who served as camp guards, for example-may not have figured this out. But Dr.
Kovacevic was a learned man, and quite skeptical to boot. He was primarily concerned
with the quality of his legal defense, and not the quality of his lifestyle in the detention
center. (Indeed, he often reassured me that he was comfortable there, and that he was
not mistreated.) He decided to substitute me for the Belgrade attorney who had
initially been assigned to him because, as he put it, he was not sure he would be getting
a good defense at the hands of "the boys from Belgrade."
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When accused persons accept the legal services of lawyers from back home, they
obtain a large number of benefits that an outside counsel such as myself could not
easily provide. For example, the lawyers at The Hague from Croatia, Bosnia, and
Serbia were all being paid a salary by the ICTY that was far above their hourly rate
back home. For me, however, the same salary was far below my hourly rate in the
United States. Thus I operated with as much efficiency as possible, whereas the
Yugoslav lawyers seemed to have an endless amount of time on their hands for
meeting, talking, and reminiscing with their clients. In turn, the clients at the drab
detention center welcomed the attention and conversation of their lawyers. The
Yugoslav lawyers provided their clients with packs of cigarettes, food from the local
restaurants, news from back home, and messages from the clients' relatives and
friends. More importantly, they were adept at arranging for family members to travel
to The Hague to meet with the accused persons in the detention center. Perhaps
their home governments paid for these visits and expedited the travel arrangements.
These were the benefits to the clients of counsel from back home, but there were
probably costs as well. The Yugoslav lawyers did not seem well prepared for trial; they
did not initiate motions on behalf of their clients (with the exception of many
complaints about conditions in the detention centers); and their briefs did not reflect
(in my opinion) much comprehension about the relevant substantive rules of
international humanitarian law. So far, the decisional record at the ICTY indicates
that nearly all accused persons who have achieved any success (either in acquittals, or
getting charges dropped, or obtaining lighter sentences) have been represented by
attorneys from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United
States.
I certainly do not claim that every lawyer out of Serbia may have had a conflict of
interest. But international war-crimes prosecutions are quite different from domesticlaw criminal cases regarding the assignment of counsel. Within a non-totalitarian
country, it is relatively easy to find defense counsel who will use their best efforts for a
client; after all, their own reputation is at stake. However, in international tribunals
such as the ICTY, lawyers from the home country also may feel a patriotic duty to
protect other citizens back home from international prosecution. Moreover, after the
case is over, they themselves have to go back home. Their own practice and livelihood
might be negatively affected if their client at the ICTY cooperated with the
prosecutors and became a witness against fellow citizens.
Another strange element of choosing defense counsel at The Hague is not
familiar to US lawyers accustomed to common law courts. This is the controlling role
of the Registrar. The Registrar, one might think, ought to be a glorified clerk.
However, the Registrar at The Hague wields a great deal of decision-making power.
The Registrar occupies a huge suite of offices at the ICTY, and has an enormous
operation. The rooms for defense counsel, in comparison, are tiny and underequipped.

Fall 2000

Cbicagojournafof7nternationa(Law

Registrars rule with an iron hand, making key decisions that would, in the
United States, be decided by judges or counsel. Prosecutors and judges defer to them.
They are powerful and power-hungry civil servants of the European
bureaucratic/technocratic tradition. I have discovered, through my experience with
another European international court, the European Court of Human Rights, that
the Registrar is even used as an informal conduit for messages to counsel of
substantive matters in their cases. What apparently goes on behind the scenes is that a
judge tells a Registrar official about the judge's impression on a substantive issue in the
case, and the Registrar then conveys that information to counsel as if it is the
Registrar's own thinking independent of the court's.
I do not see anything really wrong with this, even though it is quite contrary to
US litigation practice where clerks' messages to counsel deal only with matters of
compliance with procedural rules. In fact, as I have learned at the European Court of
Human Rights, it can be useful to counsel to obtain informal word from the judges
through this kind of intercession by the Registrar. The judge avoids official
commitment on the issue, and counsel has a chance to revise a brief or a pleading to
take care of the objection "suggested" by the Registrar. Even so, the more the Registrar
deals with substantive matters, the more likely over time the Office of the Registrar
will increase in power and prestige. The aggregation of power in an officially "neutral"
Office of the Registrar inserts an unpredictable third element into the adversary
process. It can be extremely disconcerting. My initial impression of the Registrar upon
arrival at The Hague was that the officials in that office were emotionally supportive
of the prosecutors. They seemed to regard me and other defense counsel as necessary
evils.

Over time, I modified this initial assessment. Nevertheless, it still seems to me
that there is a kind of institutional bias at work. The offices of the Registrar, the
judges, and the prosecutors take up most of the space in the building; these people see
each other socially in a relatively small city like The Hague; and they tend to share a
sense of pride and accomplishment when a war criminal is convicted. I am sure if I
worked there full time as a judge, prosecutor, or registrar, I would soon come to feel
the same way. Perhaps the establishment of a "Defense Counsel Bar" might help to
redress the institutional imbalance, and indeed at the time I was defending Dr.
Kovacevic I talked with a number of defense counsel about this possibility. The idea
may someday get off the ground. The crunch, as I see it, is if a Defense Counsel Bar
lobbies for better offices and facilities in the ICTY building, the Registrar will perceive
this as a budgetary threat to the Registrar's own plans for expansion and improvement
of its services. The number of people employed by the Registrar has skyrocketed from
a handful at first to over 300 employees at the present time. Hence, there is a
possibility that the Registrar may find it institutionally upsetting to allocate any
budgetary assistance to an association of defense counsel.
I believe it is important for lawyers who may be thinking of serving as defense
counsel at the ICTY or other international criminal tribunals to know of some
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examples of the obstacles that can be placed in their path by the Office of the
Registrar. At the outset of my representation of Dr. Kovacevic, I announced to the
Registrar my intention to bring in co-counsel. I was flatly informed that the Registrar
has discretion to approve or disapprove such a request. I did not contest the
Registrar's power to pay or refuse to pay fees to my co-counsel. But the Registrar
informed me that even ifI paid for co-counsel out of my own pocket, they still had to
approve the selection. I was told that this is what the rules require, and if anything is a
conversation-killer in dealing with the Registrar it is when they invoke "the rules."
(These rules can defy all reason, such as the rule that requires all counsel to provide a
photocopy of their actual law school diploma in order to practice in the Court.) When
they do so, they do not genuflect and lift their eyes slowly toward the ceiling. But they
convey that picture anyway.
If the Registrar makes it tough to get co-counsel, what follows is a compounding
of troubles. I had invited some Northwestern Law students to come over for a few
weeks in the summer to help me prepare the Kovacevic case for trial. I assigned one to
become familiar with the topics of the voluminous documents already filed in the case
and to be prepared to locate them when needed from a huge stack of three-ring
binders. We had the binders spread out in the courtroom on several of the tables and
chairs that were set aside for the defense attorneys. During the morning proceedings,
this student was allowed to be inside the courtroom. But when the court recessed for
lunch, the guards told her to leave. We had planned to use the lunch break together to
prepare for the afternoon's arguments. Indeed, the Registrar personnel, the
translators, and all the prosecutors and their assistants regularly used the courtroom
during the lunch break. I was allowed to use it, but my assistant was not. The reason:
"Security." This word is even holier than "the rules." I told the guard that my assistant
would stay there with me because we were working on the case, and it would be
impossible to move all the documents and ring binders to the small table in the
defense counsel office without thoroughly rearranging them and setting us back
considerably in our work. The guard argued with me, and I told him that unless he
arrested me, my assistant and I were not moving.
The guard left to call in reinforcements. Meanwhile another guard who had
observed the situation told me that the sergeant in charge is new on the job, and that
the sergeant who was usually there would have understood my need for workspace.
The Deputy Registrar then showed up with a contingent of guards who
threatened my student, and she decided that it was wise to leave the courtroom.
Respectfully and patiently, I explained to the Deputy Registrar that it was unfair to
allow the prosecutors' assistants to use the courtroom during lunch break but not the
assistants for the defense counsel. "The rules," he said, "do not provide for people who
are not admitted to practice before this tribunal to be in the courtroom during the
lunch break." Why? I asked. "Security," he said (and there was a virtual thunderbolt
outside the building).
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"Well," I protested, "you can look again inside her briefcase to see if there are any
Molotov cocktails." (We both knew that my student, as well as every person in the
building, had previously been searched carefully by the guards at the entrance gate.)
That's not the point, he replied; the point is that a rule is a rule. True, a different head
security officer might have interpreted it differently, but this one did not, and he was
not necessarily wrong. I asked the Deputy Registrar what he was going to do about it.
"As a favor to you," he said, "I won't do anything. Normally I'd write this incident up
as a breach of your obligations to the tribunal, and you would receive a letter of
reprimand from the court."
The foregoing account of the Registrar's mind-set is reflected to an extent in the
rule-bindedness of the judges themselves. In the early days of the ICTY, various
procedural rules were drafted by a committee of international experts. Naturally,
though they thought they had done a brilliant job, in fact they failed to anticipate
many of the problems that would come up. Unintended consequences then arose, but
"a rule is a rule." Only the judges could ever permit a departure from the rules, and
then, only after counsel had filed a motion,.supporting briefs, asked for oral argument
on the point, and made a convincing showing that an absurd rule was in fact absurd.
One example may illuminate the hassle-but also the ultimate fairness of the
judicial proceedings. At the pretrial stage in my case, the prosecutor wanted to amend
the indictment to include more counts against my client. The rules of the tribunal
provided that, with respect to all indictments, the prosecutor submits the indictment
to a reviewing judge who passes on their sufficiency and approves or disapproves
them. The framers of the rules had in mind the initial indictment process, prior to the
arrest of any person. But since the rule on its face applied to all indictments, the
prosecutor figured that he could add new indictments to the Complaint in an ex parte
proceeding before the reviewing judge. Without notice to me, he approached the
reviewing judge (the judge who had initially approved the genocide indictment against
Kovacevic and Drljaca), and she simply approved the added counts. At this point, Dr.
Kovacevic was already in custody and I was already defending him. Yet the prosecutor
resorted to this ex parte procedure because the rule seemed to authorize it. As soon as
I received a copy of the Amended Indictment (listing a great many more counts
against my client), I filed a motion in protest. A hearing was held before our pretrial
panel (three judges). I argued as vigorously as I could that an ex parte procedure, once
a person has been arrested and is represented by counsel, is fundamentally unfair. The
prosecutor was seeking to change the entire nature of the case against my client
without allowing me to object to the evidentiary sufficiency of the added indictments.
The prejudice to my client, and to the reputation for fairness of the tribunal, was
compromised by such a procedure, even if the rules of the tribunal appeared to allow
for it. I argued that any rule that frustrates fundamental fairness should not be
allowed to stand.
The tribunal took the motion under consideration. I went back to Chicago
(where fortunately I had a semester's leave for research) and continued to work on the
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merits of the case from my office. Two months later, on my next trip to The Hague, I
heard informally that the judges had met in plenary session and made several
amendments to the rules of procedure. I went to the Registrar's office and obtained a
copy of the changes. I discovered that the judges had amended the indictment rule so
that once an accused person is in custody, an indictment cannot be amended on an ex
parte basis. The rule was also made retroactive. So I discovered, in this totally
informal way, that I had won my motion. But the panel never issued a decision on my
motion. Indeed, the motion was now moot because the rule had been changed. Future
counsel, faced with an amendment to the complaint against their clients, would simply
assume that the rules always provided for representation by counsel if the prosecutor
sought an amendment to the indictment. Although I was glad to have won even a
silent victory, future counsel may be inhibited from challenging the rules of procedure
assuming that such motions are never granted (the court simply changes the rule in
closed session). Therefore it is important for defense counsel to know that rules can
be challenged and that judges can be persuaded that a given rule is unfair.
Unfortunately, because the tribunal hides in secrecy their reasons for changing a rule,
the rules may appear over time to acquire an imperviousness that renders them
virtually unchallengeable. This false history may operate as a deterrent to any defense
attorney who might otherwise wish to challenge a rule. Perhaps these European
tribunals are influenced by canon law, which traditionally is changed in secret
meetings of the church hierarchy who then tell the world that the canon law has never
been altered.
For counsel trained in the common law tradition, civil law courts such as the
ICTY may seem to be unfair venues to defend clients accused of a crime. There is no
doubt that the job is difficult. Yet the recent international criminal law tribunals have
taken on a grave and historic responsibility for making hitherto immune state officials
responsible for their criminal conduct. I left the ICTY with the same total
commitment to its goals as when I first took on the Kovacevic case. Perhaps the
foregoing comments may aid in improving the fairness and efficacy of the tribunal.
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